

How Important is Health Inequality for Lifetime Earnings Inequality?

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*The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System.

Introduction

- Poor health impacts individuals through several channels:
 - reduces labor productivity
 - increases costs of working, mortality risk, medical expenses
 - increases chance of access to social insurance programs (SSDI/SSI)

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▶ graph

Introduction

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increases costs of working, mortality risk, medical expenses

increases chance of access to social insurance programs (SSDI/SSI)

- Individuals in poor health have lower earnings and labor supply

▶ graph

- **Question:** How important is health inequality for lifetime earnings inequality?

- What are key channels?

availability/generosity of Soc Ins – vs – higher costs/lower productivity of work

To answer these questions

1. Construct an objective measure of “health”

- frailty index: cumulative sum of past adverse health events

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- estimate effect of health on current earnings
- assess impact of health on each margin: hours, wages, participation

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3. Quantitative Analysis: structural model consistent with empirical findings

- agents in the model have heterogeneous and risky health profiles
- use model to assess

impact of health inequality on lifetime earnings inequality

relative importance of each channel through which health operates

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- Find:
 - health inequality accounts for 30% of lifetime earnings inequality at age 65
 - 2/3 of which is due to the SSDI/SSI programs
 - yet, SSDI/SSI is ex-ante welfare improving

Plan of the Talk

How we measure health

Empirical Analysis

Structural Model

Calibration Highlights

Quantitative Exercise

How we measure health



- **Frailty index:** cumulative sum of all adverse health events (*deficits*)
 - Proposed and widely used in gerontology literature.
- Type of deficit variables used to construct frailty index in PSID:
 - Difficulties with ADL and IADL (eating, dressing, using phone, etc)
 - Diagnosis (ever had heart disease, psychological problems, loss of memory, etc)
 - Body measurements (BMI over 30, etc)
- Assign value of 1 whenever one of these conditions exists, and value of 0 o/w.
- Add them up and normalize to a number between 0 and 1.

► gerontology literature

► Why frailty?

Summary Stats for Frailty

Sample: 2003–2017 PSID household heads + spouses, ages 25–94





| | | | |
|---------------|------|--------------------------------|--------|
| Mean | 0.11 | Median | 0.07 |
| by gender: | | Standard deviation | 0.11 |
| male | 0.11 | Wave-to-wave: | |
| female | 0.12 | +Δ frailty | 0.29 |
| by education: | | −Δ frailty | 0.13 |
| HS dropouts | 0.16 | | |
| HS grads | 0.12 | Effect of 1 additional deficit | +0.037 |
| college grads | 0.08 | | |

- Mean frailty increases with age and decreases with education.

► all summary stats

Summary Stats for Frailty

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

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- Cross-sectional distribution is right-skewed both overall and by age.

► all summary stats

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- Both positive and negative changes in frailty from wave to wave.

► all summary stats

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Quantitative Exercise

Empirical Analysis: Question

- What is the effect of health — measured by frailty — on earnings/hours/wages?
- We estimate the following regression

$$y_{i,t} = b_i + \gamma f_{i,t} + \alpha_1 y_{i,t-1} + \alpha_2 y_{i,t-2} + \delta \mathbf{Z}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

using **Blundell-Bond System GMM estimator** and PSID sample (ages 25-64)

$y_{i,t}$ is log of earnings (or hours, or wages)

$\mathbf{Z}_{i,t}$ is vector of exogenous controls: marital status, marital status \times gender, # of kids, # of kids \times gender, cubic in age, and year dummies

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- Why dynamic panel?
 - Want fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
 - Earnings and frailty are both highly persistent variables.
 - Concerns of endogeneity/simultaneity.

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- Report $\gamma/27$: response of earnings/hours to one more deficit.

Effect of Frailty on Earnings

| | Everyone | | | Workers | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|-----|-----|---------|-----|-----|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| $\log(\text{earnings}_{t-1})$ | 0.283 (0.364) | | | | | |
| $\log(\text{earnings}_{t-2})$ | 0.396 (0.298) | | | | | |
| frailty_t | -0.199*** (0.061) | | | | | |

frailty \uparrow by 1 deficit

\Downarrow

earnings \downarrow 19.9%

| | |
|-----------------------------------|-------|
| AR(1) test (p -value) | 0.455 |
| AR(2) test (p -value) | 0.380 |
| Hansen test (p -value) | 0.796 |
| Diff-in-Hansen test (p -value) | 0.652 |

Note: $*p < 0.1$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$

Effect of Frailty on Earnings

| | Everyone | | | Workers | | |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------|-----|-----|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| $\log(\text{earnings}_{t-1})$ | 0.283 (0.364) | 0.370 (0.319) | 0.220 (0.362) | | | |
| $\log(\text{earnings}_{t-2})$ | 0.396 (0.298) | 0.318 (0.259) | 0.444 (0.297) | | | |
| frailty_t | -0.199*** (0.061) | | | | | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{HSD}$ | | -0.232** (0.066) | | | | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{HSG}$ | | -0.207*** (0.058) | | | | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{CG}$ | | -0.093* (0.052) | | | | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Bad Health}$ | | | -0.193*** (0.065) | | | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Good Health}$ | | | -0.071 (0.178) | | | |
| AR(1) test (p -value) | 0.455 | 0.319 | 0.497 | | | |
| AR(2) test (p -value) | 0.380 | 0.474 | 0.298 | | | |
| Hansen test (p -value) | 0.796 | 0.132 | 0.826 | | | |
| Diff-in-Hansen test (p -value) | 0.652 | 0.360 | 0.827 | | | |

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Concentrated in less educated and those in bad health

Effect of Frailty on Earnings

| | Everyone | | | Workers | | |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| $\log(\text{earnings}_{t-1})$ | 0.283 (0.364) | 0.370 (0.319) | 0.220 (0.362) | 1.474*** (0.509) | 1.371*** (0.400) | 1.293*** (0.410) |
| $\log(\text{earnings}_{t-2})$ | 0.396 (0.298) | 0.318 (0.259) | 0.444 (0.297) | -0.640 (0.454) | -0.569 (0.356) | -0.498 (0.377) |
| frailty_t | -0.199*** (0.061) | | | -0.036** (0.017) | | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{HSD}$ | | -0.232** (0.066) | | | -0.068** (0.030) | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{HSG}$ | | -0.207*** (0.058) | | | -0.046*** (0.002) | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{CG}$ | | -0.093* (0.052) | | | -0.021 (0.018) | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Bad Health}$ | | | -0.193*** (0.065) | | | -0.036** (0.017) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Good Health}$ | | | -0.071 (0.178) | | | -0.065 (0.066) |
| AR(1) test (p -value) | 0.455 | 0.319 | 0.497 | 0.030 | 0.010 | 0.021 |
| AR(2) test (p -value) | 0.380 | 0.474 | 0.298 | 0.130 | 0.082 | 0.138 |
| Hansen test (p -value) | 0.796 | 0.132 | 0.826 | 0.434 | 0.826 | 0.543 |
| Diff-in-Hansen test (p -value) | 0.652 | 0.360 | 0.827 | 0.255 | 0.484 | 0.259 |

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Primarily due to extensive margin

Effect of Frailty on Hours

| | Everyone | | | Workers | | |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| $\log(\text{hours}_{t-1})$ | 0.399 (0.322) | 0.383 (0.319) | 0.386 (0.317) | 0.003 (0.345) | 0.074 (0.313) | 0.040 (0.311) |
| $\log(\text{hours}_{t-2})$ | 0.263 (0.257) | 0.269 (0.253) | 0.272 (0.253) | 0.304 (0.218) | 0.168 (0.221) | 0.282 (0.219) |
| frailty_t | -0.144*** (0.044) | | | 0.003 (0.009) | | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{HSD}$ | | -0.177*** (0.049) | | | -0.001 (0.013) | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{HSG}$ | | -0.159*** (0.045) | | | 0.001 (0.010) | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{CG}$ | | -0.082** (0.041) | | | 0.009 (0.009) | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Bad Health}$ | | | -0.137*** (0.046) | | | 0.001 (0.010) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Good Health}$ | | | -0.082 (0.128) | | | -0.002 (0.034) |
| AR(1) test (p -value) | 0.287 | 0.290 | 0.289 | 0.409 | 0.286 | 0.335 |
| AR(2) test (p -value) | 0.596 | 0.569 | 0.565 | 0.273 | 0.572 | 0.312 |
| Hansen test (p -value) | 0.971 | 0.317 | 0.838 | 0.060 | 0.166 | 0.174 |
| Diff-in-Hansen test (p -value) | 0.944 | 0.597 | 0.713 | 0.080 | 0.062 | 0.108 |

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Similar findings for hours

► Other Results

Effect of Frailty on Wages of Workers

| | Everyone | | | Workers | | |
|--|----------|-------|-------|---------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| $\log(\text{wage}_{t-1})$ | | | | 0.212 (0.541) | 0.122 (0.368) | 0.303 (0.449) |
| $\log(\text{wage}_{t-2})$ | | | | 0.532 (0.489) | 0.600* (0.328) | 0.461 (0.419) |
| frailty_t | | | | -0.023** (0.010) | | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{HSD}$ | | | | | -0.069*** (0.023) | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{HSG}$ | | | | | -0.033*** (0.011) | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{CG}$ | | | | | -0.008 (0.011) | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Bad Health}$ | | | | | | -0.022* (0.012) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Good Health}$ | | | | | | 0.013 (0.062) |
| AR(1) test (p -value) | 0.651 | 0.518 | 0.552 | | | |
| AR(2) test (p -value) | 0.454 | 0.189 | 0.474 | | | |
| Hansen test (p -value) | 0.085 | 0.374 | 0.207 | | | |
| Diff-in-Hansen test (p -value) | 0.044 | 0.145 | 0.082 | | | |

Note:

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Average effect of frailty on wages is small

Significant negative effect for less educated workers

► Other Results

Effect of Earnings on Frailty

| | Everyone | | | |
|---|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| frailty _{t-1} | 0.445 (0.463) | 0.334 (0.435) | -0.152 (0.528) | -0.456 (0.400) |
| frailty _{t-2} | 0.602 (0.447) | 0.661 (0.443) | 1.124** (0.495) | 1.446*** (0.404) |
| log(earnings _t) | 0.004* (0.002) | | | |
| log(earnings _t) × HSD | | 0.003 (0.002) | | |
| log(earnings _t) × HS | | -0.008 (0.039) | | |
| log(earnings _t) × CL | | 0.000 (0.001) | | |
| log(earnings _t) × Bad Health | | | 0.002 (0.002) | |
| log(earnings _t) × Good Health | | | 0.000 (0.003) | |
| log(earnings _t) × Young | | | | -0.000 (0.001) |
| log(earnings _t) × Old | | | | -0.000 (0.002) |
| AR(1) test (<i>p</i> -value) | 0.531 | 0.573 | 0.501 | 0.001 |
| AR(2) test (<i>p</i> -value) | 0.333 | 0.260 | 0.061 | 0.002 |
| Hansen test (<i>p</i> -value) | 0.269 | 0.842 | 0.621 | 0.129 |
| Diff-in-Hansen test (<i>p</i> -value) | 0.450 | 0.852 | 0.894 | 0.132 |

No statistically significant effect of changes in earnings on frailty

Consistent with empirical literature

► empirical literature

Note:

p* < 0.1; *p* < 0.05; ****p* < 0.01

Empirical Findings — Summary

- Increases in frailty reduce earnings and hours.
- The effect is
 - primarily driven by employment margin.
 - concentrated in less educated and less healthy individuals.
- These findings suggest that
 - health inequality may be an important source of lifetime earnings inequality.
 - social insurance may play an important role.
- Next: Quantify the impact of health inequality on lifetime earnings inequality (and importance of various channels).

Plan of the Talk

How we measure health

Empirical Analysis

Structural Model

Calibration Highlights

Quantitative Exercise

Quantitative Model Overview

- J period, OLG, GE model.
- Individuals are subject to exogenous shocks:
 - frailty, productivity, and job separation.
- If separated, can choose to pay a one-time wage cost and go back to work.
- Frailty impacts an individual's
 - Labor productivity
 - Mortality
 - OOP medical expenditures
 - Disutility of working
 - Probability of becoming DI beneficiary.

Quantitative Model Overview

- **Individuals:**
 - **Employed:**
 - If young: can choose to switch to non-employment.
 - If old: can choose to retire.
 - **Non-employed:**
 - Become a DI beneficiary with some probability.
 - Can choose to go to employed state.
 - **DI beneficiaries:**
 - Collect SSDI/SSI benefits until retirement at age R .
 - **Retirees:**
 - Collect social security benefits and do not work.
- **Government:** collects taxes (capital, income, payroll)
 - Pays out SS, SSDI, SSI, and means-tested transfers + exogenous government purchases.

Problem of Young Employed Individual

Employed individual with $j < R - 1$ solves

$$V^E(x, i_s) = \max_{c, a' \geq 0} u(c, v(f)) + \sigma \beta p(j, f, s) E \left[\max \left\{ V^E(x', 1), V^N(x', 0) \right\} \right] \\ + (1 - \sigma) \beta p(j, f, s) E \left[\max \left\{ V^E(x', 0), V^N(x', 0) \right\} \right]$$

subject to ...

- individual state variable $x = (j, a, s, f, \epsilon, \bar{e})$
 - j : age
 - a : assets
 - s : education
 - f : frailty $\equiv \psi(j, s, \varepsilon_f)$ where ε_f is frailty shocks and fixed effect
 - ϵ : productivity shock and fixed effect
 - \bar{e} : average past earnings

Problem of Young Employed Individual

Employed individual with $j < R - 1$ solves

$$V^E(x, i_s) = \max_{c, a' \geq 0} u(c, v(f)) + \sigma \beta p(j, f, s) E \left[\max \left\{ V^E(x', 1), V^N(x', 0) \right\} \right] \\ + (1 - \sigma) \beta p(j, f, s) E \left[\max \left\{ V^E(x', 0), V^N(x', 0) \right\} \right]$$

subject to

$$\frac{a'}{1+r} + c + m^E(j, f, s) = a + w\eta(j, f, s, \epsilon) - T(w\eta) - \chi(w\eta)i_s + Tr(x, i_s),$$

$$\bar{e}' = [(j-1)\bar{e} + w\eta]/j$$

- i_s : indicates the worker is coming from separation

Problem of Young Employed Individual

Employed individual with $j < R - 1$ solves

$$V^E(x, i_s) = \max_{c, a' \geq 0} u(c, v(f)) + \sigma \beta p(j, f, s) E \left[\max \left\{ V^E(x', 1), V^N(x', 0) \right\} \right] \\ + (1 - \sigma) \beta p(j, f, s) E \left[\max \left\{ V^E(x', 0), V^N(x', 0) \right\} \right]$$

subject to ...

- Utility function is

$$u(c, v(f)) = \frac{\left(c^\mu (1 - v(f))^{1-\mu} \right)^{1-\gamma}}{1 - \gamma},$$

where $v(f) = \phi_0 + \phi_1 f^{\phi_2}$, $\phi_0 \geq 0$, $\phi_1 \geq 0$, and $\phi_2 \geq 0$.

Problem of Old Employed Individual

Employed individual with $j > R - 1$ solves

$$V^E(x, i_s) = \max_{c, a' \geq 0} u(c, v(f)) + \sigma p(j, f, s) E \left[\max \left\{ V^E(x', 1), V^R(x') \right\} \right] \\ + (1 - \sigma) \beta p(j, f, s) E \left[\max \left\{ V^E(x', 0), V^R(x') \right\} \right]$$

subject to

$$\frac{a'}{1+r} + c + m^R(j, f, s) = a + w\eta(j, f, s, \epsilon) + SS(\bar{e}) - T(w\eta) \\ - \chi(w\eta)i_s + Tr(x, i_s),$$

$$\bar{e}' = \bar{e}$$

Problem of Young Non-employed Individual

Non-employed individual with $j < R - 1$ solves

$$V^N(x, n_a) = \max_{c, a' \geq 0} u(c) + \theta(f, n_a) \beta p(j, f, s) E[V^D(x', 0)] \\ + [1 - \theta(f, n_a)] \beta p(j, f, s) E\left[\max\{V^E(x', 1), V^N(x', n_a + 1)\}\right]$$

subject to

$$\frac{a'}{1+r} + c + m^N(j, f, s) = a + Tr(x).$$

- n_a : number of periods in non-employment.
- Probability of successful DI application: $\theta(f, n_a) = \min\{1, \kappa_0 f^{\kappa_1} n_a^{\kappa_2}\}$

Problem of a DI Beneficiary

- DI beneficiary with $j < R - 1$ solves

$$V^D(x, n_d) = \max_{c, a' \geq 0} u(c) + \beta p(j, f, s) E[V^D(x', n_d + 1)]$$

subject to

$$\frac{a'}{1+r} + c + m^D(j, f, s, n_d) = a + SS(\bar{e}) + Tr(x, n_d).$$

- n_d : number of periods on DI.

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Calibration Highlights

Quantitative Exercise

Calibration Strategy Overview

- Model period is 1 year.
- Agents live from $j = 1$ (age 25) to a maximum $J = 70$ (age 94).
- Frailty affects earnings through five channels:

1. Survival rate
2. Out of pocket medical expenditures
3. Labor productivity – proxied by hourly wages
4. Probability of successful DI application
5. Preferences – disutility of work

} estimated outside model


} calibrated using model

Stochastic process for frailty


- Assume positive fraction of people with zero frailty at age 25.
- Each period, frailty remains zero with probability $P(\text{age})$ and becomes positive with probability $1 - P(\text{age})$.
- If positive, log frailty is sum of
 - **deterministic component:** age poly
 - **stochastic component:** fixed effect, transitory shock, and AR(1) shock
- Estimate separately for each education group.
- To account for selection due to mortality, estimation uses
 - auxiliary simulation model
 - simulated method of moments

Stochastic frailty process for high school graduates


Fraction w/zero frailty



Mean log frailty age-profile (deterministic component targets)



Variance-covariance moments (stochastic component targets)




► HSD


► COL

Stochastic frailty process for high school graduates


Fraction w/zero frailty



Mean log frailty age-profile
(deterministic component targets)



Variance-covariance moments
(stochastic component targets)



- **Important to account for selection:** effects of mortality on mean and variance of log frailty are large at older ages.

Stochastic process for productivity

- By education, log productivity (wage) is sum of
 - **deterministic component:** age poly and **quadratic frailty effect**
 - **stochastic component:** fixed effect and AR(1) shock
- Frailty effects are estimated using dynamic panel system GMM estimator.
 - Correct for selection bias using a procedure recommended by Al-Saddoon et al. (2019).
- Effect of an additional deficit on wage:

| | HSD | HSG | COL (frailty < 76th prctile) | COL (frailty = 95th prctile) |
|-------------------|-------|-------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Before correction | -4.2% | -2.5% | 0% | -2.6% |
| After correction | -4.4% | -2.7% | 0% | -2.8% |


[► Details](#)[► Compare](#)[► Severe disability](#)

Disutility of Work vs DI Probabilities


Identification Strategy

- DI probability and disutility of work parameters calibrated using the model.
- Calibration targets:
 - DI reciprocity rates by age and frailty for ages 25 to 64.
 - Labor force participation by age and frailty for ages 25 to 74.
 - Relative DI acceptance rate by number of years tried.
- Effect of frailty on disutility of work is identified by dispersion in LFPR's by frailty for 65-74 year-olds.
- **Idea:** DI process does not directly affect labor supply after age 65.

DI and LFP by Age and Frailty: Model vs Data





Data source: MEPS 2000–2016 and SSA.



Data source: 2003–2015 PSID men ages 25–84.


- Target more moments in the unhealthy tail of frailty distribution.

DI and LFP by Age and Frailty: Model vs Data



- Target more moments in the unhealthy tail of frailty distribution.
- Model matches moments well including the dispersion in LFPR's by frailty for 65-74 year-olds.
- DI probability and disutility from working are increasing and convex in frailty.

DI acceptance rate: Model vs. Data



Data source: French and Song (2014)


- Model also matches rate of decline in DI acceptance by year since initial application
- DI probability increases in numbers of years since initially applied.

► Values


► Assessment

Assessment: % on DI by frailty, age, and education


High School Dropouts




High School Grads



College Grads

[Larger](#)[Aggregate](#)

Assessment: % on DI by frailty, age, and education




- The model matches levels and patterns of DI reciprocity education.


► Larger ► Aggregate

Assessment: LFP by frailty, age, and education


High School Dropouts



High School Grads




College Grads



► Larger

► Aggregate

Assessment: LFP by frailty, age, and education



- The model matches levels and patterns of LFP by education.

► Larger ► Aggregate

Assessment: Impact of DI benefit denial on labor force participation

Table: Individuals denied benefits in first year of application: fraction working 3 years later

| Ages | Period | 25–64 | 35–64 | 45–64 |
|---------------------------|--------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Model | | 31% | 28% | 26% |
| Empirical estimates | | | | |
| French & Song (2014) | 1990's | | 26% | |
| Maestas et al. (2013) | early 2000's | 27% | | |
| Von Wachter et al. (2011) | 1982 | | | 31% |
| Von Wachter et al. (2011) | 1997 | | | 35% |
| Bound (1989) | 1977 | | | 32% |

French & Song (2014) is for individuals denied benefits 2 years after application. Maestas et al. (2013) is for 18 to 64 year-olds.

- Labor force participation of those denied DI benefits are consistent with empirical estimates.

Plan of the Talk

How we measure health

Empirical Analysis

Structural Model

Calibration Highlights

Quantitative Exercise


Quantitative Exercise

- To understand the impact of health inequality on lifetime earnings inequality:
 - Consider a counterfactual economy where everyone has the same (average) frailty profile.
 - What is the impact on **inequality** in **lifetime earnings** at each age?

lifetime earnings at age j = sum of all earnings up to age j

inequality = variance of log

Lifetime earnings inequality by age: Variance of log



| | Age 45 | Age 55 | Age 65 | Age 75 |
|--------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Benchmark | 0.390 | 0.443 | 0.453 | 0.410 |
| No frailty heterogeneity | 0.339 | 0.322 | 0.315 | 0.310 |
| $\Delta \downarrow$ | 13.1% | 27.4% | 30.4% | 24.3% |

Quantitative Model Results: Decomposition

- How important are each of the 5 channels through which health affects individuals?
 1. Probability of getting DI
 2. Labor productivity
 3. Disutility
 4. Medical expenses
 5. Survival probability
- To assess the importance of each channel:
 - Run 5 counterfactuals
 - Counterfactual 1: Equivalent to baseline except probability of DI is determined by average frailty profile.
 - And so on...

Computational Experiments: Decomposition

Table: Effect of removing frailty variation in each channel on the variance of log lifetime earnings

| | age 45 | age 55 | age 65 | age 75 |
|-----------------------|--------|---------|---------|---------|
| 1. DI channel | ↓ 0.6% | ↓ 14.2% | ↓ 21.0% | ↓ 19.9% |
| 2. Labor prod channel | ↓ 2.3% | ↓ 3.7% | ↓ 4.1% | ↓ 4.3% |
| 3. Disutility channel | ↓ 0.4% | ↓ 0.8% | ↓ 1.0% | ↓ 0.9% |
| 4. Med exp channel | ↓ 0.1% | ↓ 0.2% | ↓ 0.0% | ↑ 0.0% |
| 5. Surv prob channel | ↓ 0.9% | ↑ 0.3% | ↑ 8.3% | ↑ 5.9% |

- These three channels are least important.

Computational Experiments: Decomposition

Table: Effect of removing frailty variation in each channel on the variance of log lifetime earnings

| | age 45 | age 55 | age 65 | age 75 |
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| 1. DI channel | ↓ 0.6% | ↓ 14.2% | ↓ 21.0% | ↓ 19.9% |
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| 5. Surv prob channel | ↓ 0.9% | ↑ 0.3% | ↑ 8.3% | ↑ 5.9% |

- Removing DI channel ↑ inequality at younger ages and ↓ it at older ages.



Computational Experiments: Decomposition

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
- Removing DI channel ↑ inequality at younger ages and ↓ it at older ages.
- Removing productivity channel ↓ lifetime earnings inequality at all ages.

LFP in Counterfactual Economies



- LFP effects of removing frailty variation concentrated in unhealthy tail of frailty distribution.


LFP of Highly Frail in Counterfactual Economies



- Without DI channel:

- Frail individuals no longer qualify for DI w/ high probability \Rightarrow Highly frail old's LFP \uparrow
- Less incentive to work to accumulate SSDI earnings credits \Rightarrow Highly frail young's LFP \downarrow .

LFP of Highly Frail in Counterfactual Economies



- Without productivity channel:
 - Wages of frail individuals $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ Highly frail LFP \uparrow at all ages.

Welfare effects of eliminating the DI program

- SSDI/SSI is primary channel through which health inequality leads to \uparrow lifetime earnings inequality. Should we eliminate it?

Welfare effects of eliminating the DI program

- SSDI/SSI is primary channel through which health inequality leads to \uparrow lifetime earnings inequality. Should we eliminate it?
- No, removing DI program reduces ex-ante welfare.

| Ex-ante welfare changes (% of lifetime consumption) | | | | |
|---|---------|--------|--------|-------|
| | Average | HSD | HSG | COL |
| No DI program (PE) no benefits or DI payroll taxes | -1.16% | -3.14% | -1.81% | 0.74% |
| No DI program (GE), prop. increase in income taxes | -1.80% | -3.70% | -2.45% | 0.05% |
| No DI program (GE), reduction of consumption floor | -2.50% | -5.81% | -3.22% | 0.09% |

Understanding the welfare value of DI: insurance v. redistribution

- Ex ante welfare losses are due to a loss of both insurance and redistribution.
- To understand their relative importance, consider a DI program with no redistribution across education: DI is self-financed within each education group.

Understanding the welfare value of DI: insurance v. redistribution

Ex-ante welfare changes (% of lifetime consumption)

| | Average | HSD | HSG | COL |
|---|---------|--------|--------|-------|
| No DI program (PE) no benefits or DI payroll taxes | -1.16% | -3.14% | -1.81% | 0.74% |
| No DI redistribution (PE), benefits financed by education-specific payroll taxes | -0.20% | -1.99% | -0.54% | 1.08% |
| No DI redistribution (GE), income taxes adjust to clear govt budget | | | | |

- About **two-thirds** (**one-third**) of welfare benefit of DI for **HSD** (**HSG**) comes from redistribution.

Understanding the welfare value of DI: insurance v. redistribution

Ex-ante welfare changes (% of lifetime consumption)

| | Average | HSD | HSG | COL |
|---|---------|--------|--------|--------|
| No DI program (PE) no benefits or DI payroll taxes | -1.16% | -3.14% | -1.81% | 0.74% |
| No DI redistribution (PE), benefits financed by education-specific payroll taxes | -0.20% | -1.99% | -0.54% | 1.08% |
| No DI redistribution (GE), income taxes adjust to clear govt budget | -1.61% | -3.21% | -1.93% | -0.42% |

- In PE, college value DI program with no redistribution.
- But, they are worse off in GE because increased reliance on means-tested programs leads to higher income taxes.

Conclusion

- Document empirically:
 - Large response of earnings to incremental changes in frailty: mostly driven by participation.
 - Wage effects for less educated workers.
- Results from structural model:
 - Health inequality accounts for a substantial fraction (30%) of lifetime earnings inequality at age 65.
 - Reduced participation due to increased access to SSDI/SSI when health is poor plays an important role.
 - Yet, SSDI/SSI is ex-ante welfare improving.

The End


Thank You!

Plan of the Talk

back up


Back Up Slides

Fraction at zero: Model vs Data



- Removing frailty heterogeneity also reduces the fraction with zero lifetime earnings.


Lifetime earnings inequality by age: Ratios



- Impact is concentrated in the bottom of the lifetime earnings distribution.

Quantitative Model Results

Lifetime earnings inequality by age: Gini




- Removing frailty heterogeneity reduces the Gini of lifetime earnings at age 65 by 8.5%.

Lifetime earnings inequality by age: Variance decomposition

| Contribution of Ex-ante Heterogeneity vs. Frailty Shocks | | | | |
|--|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| | Age 45 | Age 55 | Age 65 | Age 75 |
| Benchmark | 0.390 | 0.443 | 0.453 | 0.410 |
| No frailty heterogeneity $\Delta \downarrow$ | 0.339 13.1% | 0.322 27.4% | 0.315 30.4% | 0.310 24.3% |
| No frailty fixed effect $\Delta \downarrow$ | 0.349 10.5% | 0.388 12.4% | 0.392 13.5% | 0.367 10.6% |
| No frailty shock $\Delta \downarrow$ | 0.338 13.5% | 0.337 24.0% | 0.349 22.9% | 0.346 15.7% |

- Health shocks account for $\approx 2/3$'s of the impact of health inequality on lifetime earnings inequality.
- Removing heterogeneity vs risk vs both impacts both amount and timing of lifecycle labor supply.


Removing heterogeneity vs shocks vs both: Fraction employed




- No fixed effect, shocks, or both: lifetime labor supply $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ lifetime earnings inequality \downarrow
- No fixed effects **and** no shocks: labor supply of young $\downarrow \Rightarrow$ lifetime earnings inequality \uparrow
- No fixed effects **or** no shocks: labor supply of young $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ lifetime earnings inequality \downarrow

Alternative measures of inequality: Variance of log

Lifetime disposable income





Lifetime labor earnings



| | Age 45 | Age 55 | Age 65 | Age 75 |
|--------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Benchmark | 0.302 | 0.328 | 0.326 | 0.318 |
| No frailty heterogeneity | 0.267 | 0.276 | 0.283 | 0.272 |
| $\Delta \downarrow$ | 11.7% | 15.8 % | 13.3% | 14.5% |

[► Details](#)[► Go back](#)

Consumption inequality: Variance of log



| | Age 45 | Age 55 | Age 65 | Age 75 |
|--------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Benchmark | 0.373 | 0.478 | 0.534 | 0.487 |
| No frailty heterogeneity | 0.304 | 0.370 | 0.383 | 0.375 |
| $\Delta \downarrow$ | 18.5% | 22.5 % | 28.3% | 23.1% |

Aggregate effects of frailty heterogeneity

| | NFH in model | NFH in DI | NFH in Disutility | NFH in Labor prod. | NFH in Med. Exp. | NFH in Mortality |
|--------------|--------------------------------|--------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | % change relative to benchmark | | | | | |
| GDP | 2.15 | 1.35 | 2.25 | 1.75 | 0.13 | -0.72 |
| Consumption | 0.92 | 0.61 | 1.68 | 1.14 | 0.09 | -1.54 |
| Capital | 2.15 | 1.35 | 2.25 | 1.75 | 0.13 | -0.72 |
| Labor input | 2.15 | 1.35 | 2.25 | 1.75 | 0.13 | -0.72 |
| Hours | 3.48 | 1.35 | 2.95 | 2.23 | 0.17 | -0.50 |
| GDP per Hour | -1.29 | 0.01 | -0.67 | -0.46 | -0.04 | -0.23 |

Note: NFH: no frailty heterogeneity.

- Removing frailty heterogeneity increases GDP per capita.
- Effects of higher LFP larger than effect of lower mortality.

Alternative Inequality Measure


Inequality in lifetime disposable income by age: Variance of Log

| | Age 45 | Age 55 | Age 65 | Age 75 |
|--------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Benchmark | 0.302 | 0.328 | 0.326 | 0.318 |
| No frailty heterogeneity | 0.267 | 0.276 | 0.283 | 0.272 |
| $\Delta \downarrow$ | 11.7% | 15.8 % | 13.3% | 14.5% |
| No frailty shock | 0.261 | 0.277 | 0.286 | 0.275 |
| $\Delta \downarrow$ | 13.5% | 15.7% | 12.4% | 13.4% |
| No frailty fixed effect | 0.265 | 0.287 | 0.286 | 0.274 |
| $\Delta \downarrow$ | 12.4% | 12.5% | 12.2% | 13.7% |





- Both shocks and fixed effect have a large effect on disposable income inequality.

► Go Back

Frailty-Earnings Correlation by Age



Frailty Correlations by Age




Gerontology Literature

- Mitnitski et al. (2001); Mitnitski et al. (2002)
- Mitnitski et al. (2005); Goggins et al. (2005)
- Searle et al. (2008); Yang and Lee (2010)
- Woo et al. (2005); Rockwood and Mitnitski (2007)
- Rockwood et al. (2007); Mitnitski et al. (2004)
- Kulminski et al. (2007a); Kulminksi et al. (2007b)

Frailty and SRHS over the Life Cycle

Data: Household heads and spouses in 2003–2015 PSID




- Area shows share reporting each SRHS at each age.
- We partition frailty distribution at each age.
- Choose cutoffs to match dist. of SRHS at 25-29.
- Hold cutoffs fixed.

Health declines faster after age 50 when measured by frailty.


► Go Back

Frailty and SRHS over the Life Cycle

HRS Sample



MEPS Sample



[Go Back](#)

Probit: Becoming a DI recipient (HRS)

| | Panel A: everyone | | | Panel B: by SRHS health at $t - 1$ | | | | |
|--|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | 'Excellent' (1) | 'Very good' (2) | 'Good' (3) | 'Fair' (4) | 'Poor' (5) |
| very good _{$t-1$} | 0.070 (0.049) | | -0.085 (0.053) | | | | | |
| good _{$t-1$} | 0.418*** (0.046) | | 0.015 (0.051) | | | | | |
| fair _{$t-1$} | 0.984*** (0.046) | | 0.306*** (0.053) | | | | | |
| poor _{$t-1$} | 1.597*** (0.049) | | 0.555*** (0.058) | | | | | |
| frailty _{$t-1$} | | 7.275*** (0.253) | 6.098*** (0.273) | 6.572*** (1.256) | 4.310*** (0.879) | 4.676*** (0.613) | 5.381*** (0.518) | 4.806*** (0.725) |
| frailty _{$t-1$} ² | | -4.929*** (0.368) | -4.387*** (0.384) | -3.297 (2.478) | -0.388 (1.806) | -0.792 (1.036) | -3.438*** (0.735) | -3.550*** (0.833) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 76,513 | 76,513 | 76,513 | 12,478 | 25,409 | 23,486 | 11,679 | 3,461 |
| Pseudo R^2 | 0.178 | 0.239 | 0.252 | 0.211 | 0.116 | 0.161 | 0.111 | 0.064 |

Data: HRS respondents under age 66. Panel A are results from the full sample while Panel B are results obtained using sub-samples based on SRHS in wave $t - 1$. Controls are gender, education, marital status and quadratic in age. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Probit: Becoming a DI recipient (PSID)

| | Panel A: younger than 66 | | | Panel B: by SRHS health at $t - 1$ | | | | |
|--|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | 'Excellent' (1) | 'Very good' (2) | 'Good' (3) | 'Fair' (4) | 'Poor' (5) |
| very good _{$t-1$} | 0.080 (0.073) | | -0.054 (0.077) | | | | | |
| good _{$t-1$} | 0.487*** (0.067) | | 0.208*** (0.072) | | | | | |
| fair _{$t-1$} | 1.013*** (0.069) | | 0.484*** (0.076) | | | | | |
| poor _{$t-1$} | 1.622*** (0.078) | | 0.745*** (0.089) | | | | | |
| frailty _{$t-1$} | | 7.380*** (0.385) | 5.992*** (0.408) | 6.061*** (2.310) | 5.595*** (1.300) | 5.361*** (0.879) | 5.672*** (0.830) | 4.232*** (1.212) |
| frailty _{$t-1$} ² | | -5.558*** (0.654) | -4.879*** (0.676) | -7.942 (7.899) | -3.237 (3.188) | -2.366 (1.928) | -4.030*** (1.352) | -3.262** (1.572) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 45,906 | 45,906 | 45,906 | 9,240 | 16,816 | 14,271 | 4,542 | 1,037 |
| Pseudo R^2 | 0.187 | 0.232 | 0.251 | 0.145 | 0.118 | 0.151 | 0.111 | 0.077 |

Data: PSID respondents under age 66. Panel A are results from the full sample while Panel B are results obtained using sub-samples based on SRHS in wave $t - 1$. Controls are gender, education, marital status and quadratic in age. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

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Probit: Becoming a DI recipient - under 45 only (PSID)

| | Panel A: younger than 45 | | | Panel B: by SRHS health at $t - 1$ | | | | |
|--|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | 'Excellent' (1) | 'Very good' (2) | 'Good' (3) | 'Fair' (4) | 'Poor' (5) |
| very good _{$t-1$} | 0.113 (0.100) | | -0.024 (0.105) | | | | | |
| good _{$t-1$} | 0.330*** (0.097) | | 0.055 (0.104) | | | | | |
| fair _{$t-1$} | 0.999*** (0.099) | | 0.479*** (0.110) | | | | | |
| poor _{$t-1$} | 1.550*** (0.125) | | 0.627*** (0.146) | | | | | |
| frailty _{$t-1$} | | 6.964*** (0.651) | 5.838*** (0.687) | 4.036 (2.863) | 5.788*** (1.803) | 4.022*** (1.407) | 6.242*** (1.381) | 9.881*** (3.044) |
| frailty _{$t-1$} ² | | -4.370*** (1.175) | -3.910*** (1.209) | -5.259 (9.696) | -0.602 (4.266) | 0.691 (2.964) | -4.022* (2.243) | -9.945** (4.085) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 23,475 | 23,475 | 23,475 | 5,693 | 9,062 | 6,650 | 1,775 | 295 |
| Pseudo R^2 | 0.153 | 0.218 | 0.237 | 0.097 | 0.158 | 0.149 | 0.152 | 0.149 |

Data: PSID respondents under age 66. Panel A are results from the full sample while Panel B are results obtained using sub-samples based on SRHS in wave $t - 1$. Controls are gender, education, marital status and quadratic in age. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

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Probit: Mortality

| | Panel A: everyone | | | Panel B: by SRHS health at $t - 1$ | | | | |
|--|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | 'Excellent' (1) | 'Very good' (2) | 'Good' (3) | 'Fair' (4) | 'Poor' (5) |
| very good _{$t-1$} | 0.053** (0.024) | | -0.007 (0.025) | | | | | |
| good _{$t-1$} | 0.293*** (0.023) | | 0.120*** (0.024) | | | | | |
| fair _{$t-1$} | 0.649*** (0.023) | | 0.300*** (0.025) | | | | | |
| poor _{$t-1$} | 1.186*** (0.024) | | 0.570*** (0.027) | | | | | |
| frailty _{$t-1$} | | 2.970*** (0.098) | 1.886*** (0.107) | 2.595*** (0.452) | 2.377*** (0.267) | 2.456*** (0.215) | 1.345*** (0.233) | 0.499 (0.350) |
| frailty _{$t-1$} ² | | -0.490*** (0.120) | 0.105 (0.126) | 0.295 (0.651) | 0.463 (0.368) | 0.164 (0.275) | 1.000*** (0.265) | 1.406*** (0.350) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 212,978 | 212,978 | 212,978 | 23,689 | 53,552 | 57,117 | 34,890 | 14,109 |
| Pseudo R^2 | 0.217 | 0.241 | 0.251 | 0.259 | 0.233 | 0.220 | 0.188 | 0.148 |

Data: HRS. Panel A are results from the full sample while Panel B are results obtained using sub-samples based on SRHS in wave $t - 1$. Controls are gender, education, marital status and quadratic in age. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.


Probit: Entering Nursing Home

| | Panel A: everyone | | | Panel B: by SRHS health at $t - 1$ | | | | |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | 'Excellent' (1) | 'Very good' (2) | 'Good' (3) | 'Fair' (4) | 'Poor' (5) |
| very good _{$t-1$} | 0.008 (0.044) | | -0.064 (0.046) | | | | | |
| good _{$t-1$} | 0.139*** (0.042) | | -0.044 (0.045) | | | | | |
| fair _{$t-1$} | 0.360*** (0.043) | | 0.012 (0.047) | | | | | |
| poor _{$t-1$} | 0.700*** (0.045) | | 0.125** (0.052) | | | | | |
| frailty _{$t-1$} | | 1.975*** (0.211) | 1.798*** (0.227) | 2.580** (1.010) | 1.445** (0.577) | 2.089*** (0.470) | 0.574 (0.469) | -0.437 (0.667) |
| frailty _{$t-1$} ² | | 0.160 (0.269) | 0.160 (0.279) | -0.791 (1.641) | 1.449 (0.908) | -0.113 (0.661) | 1.437** (0.562) | 2.212*** (0.683) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 168,412 | 168,412 | 168,412 | 19,602 | 49,875 | 53,616 | 33,040 | 12,279 |
| Pseudo R^2 | 0.231 | 0.261 | 0.263 | 0.369 | 0.288 | 0.256 | 0.218 | 0.166 |


Data: HRS. Panel A are results from the full sample while Panel B are results obtained using sub-samples based on SRHS in wave $t - 1$. Controls are gender, education, marital status and quadratic in age. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Why use frailty index?

Frailty Distribution by Frailty Quintile and Age



Frailty Distribution by SRHS and Age



Lots of action in the tails: need for finer grid.

Summary Statistics for PSID Sample

| | 2002 | 2004 | 2006 | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016 | Pooled 2002-2016 |
|--|---|---|---|---|--|--|---|---|---|
| <i>Panel A: Mean (median) [standard deviation] of sample characteristics</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Age | 44.33 (43) [15.24] | 44.28 (43) [15.53] | 44.34 (43) [15.67] | 44.58 (43) [15.8] | 44.74 (43) [16.01] | 45.02 (43) [16.08] | 45.4 (43) [16.04] | 45.54 (42) [15.99] | 44.65 (43) [15.71] |
| Frailty | 0.1 (0.07) [0.1] | 0.1 (0.07) [0.11] | 0.11 (0.07) [0.11] | 0.11 (0.07) [0.11] | 0.12 (0.07) [0.12] | 0.12 (0.07) [0.12] | 0.12 (0.1) [0.12] | 0.12 (0.07) [0.12] | 0.11 (0.07) [0.12] |
| Annual Earnings | \$35,623.31 (27,231.43) [68,179.23] | \$35,992.43 (27,247.63) [63,875.82] | \$36,313.91 (27,474.38) [62,243.45] | \$36,712.28 (26,544.91) [74,320.19] | \$33,658.89 (22,987.3) [57,064.71] | \$34,072.19 (23,000) [87,518.92] | \$33,635.38 (23,339.49) [65,135.22] | \$35,303.67 (24,978.14) [51,803.91] | \$35,095.34 (25,564.01) [64,377.99] |
| Annual Hours | 1,531.6 (1,888) [1,035.63] | 1,528.01 (1,880) [1,049.47] | 1,517.57 (1,880) [1,042.58] | 1,448.99 (1,813.5) [991.18] | 1,377.42 (1,700) [1,033.49] | 1,411.74 (1,783) [1,045.86] | 1,434.46 (1,814) [1,057.89] | 1,471.19 (1,872) [1,059.13] | 1,476.92 (1,840.5) [1,037.86] |
| Hourly Wage | \$23.43 (17.67) [37.64] | \$24.31 (17.77) [57.69] | \$24.35 (17.67) [61.27] | \$24.76 (18.74) [36.63] | \$24.14 (17.76) [29.94] | \$23.59 (17) [40.69] | \$23.11 (17.23) [31.39] | \$24.03 (18) [28.38] | \$23.78 (17.68) [40.52] |
| <i>Panel B: Fraction of sample by characteristics</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Male | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.46 |
| +Δ Frailty | - | 0.3 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.3 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.29 | 0.3 |
| -Δ Frailty | - | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.14 |
| Observations (N) | 11,777 | 12,210 | 12,727 | 13,177 | 13,473 | 13,524 | 13,294 | 14,092 | 104,274 |
| # of Individuals (n) | | | | | | | | | 21,024 |
| Average # of Years Observed (T) | | | | | | | | | 4.86 |

Note: The summary statistics are for ages 25 to 94 of household heads and spouses. Annual earnings is an individual's labor earnings for the year (in 2012\$). Annual hours is the sum of reported working hours for the year. Hourly wage is annual earnings divided by annual hours for labor force participants. Means are reported; median values are reported in parentheses; standard deviations are reported in brackets.

Summary Statistics for PSID Sample

| | 2002 | 2004 | 2006 | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016 | Pooled 2002-2016 |
|--|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| <i>Panel A: Mean (median) [standard deviation] of sample characteristics</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Age | 44.33 [15.24] | 44.28 [15.53] | 44.34 [15.67] | 44.58 [15.8] | 44.74 [16.01] | 45.02 [16.08] | 45.4 [16.04] | 45.54 [15.99] | 44.65 [15.71] |
| Frailty | 0.1 [0.1] | 0.1 [0.11] | 0.11 [0.11] | 0.11 [0.11] | 0.12 [0.12] | 0.12 [0.12] | 0.12 [0.12] | 0.12 [0.12] | 0.11 [0.12] |
| Annual Earnings | \$35,623.31 [68,179.23] | \$35,992.43 [63,875.82] | \$36,313.91 [62,243.45] | \$36,712.28 [74,320.19] | \$33,658.89 [57,064.71] | \$34,072.19 [87,518.92] | \$33,635.38 [65,135.22] | \$35,303.67 [51,803.91] | \$35,095.34 [64,377.99] |
| Annual Hours | 1,531.6 [1,035.63] | 1,528.01 [1,049.47] | 1,517.57 [1,042.58] | 1,448.99 [991.18] | 1,377.42 [1,033.49] | 1,411.74 [1,045.86] | 1,434.46 [1,057.89] | 1,471.19 [1,059.13] | 1,476.92 [1,037.86] |
| Hourly Wage | \$23.43 [37.64] | \$24.31 [57.69] | \$24.35 [61.27] | \$24.76 [36.63] | \$24.14 [29.94] | \$23.59 [40.69] | \$23.11 [31.39] | \$24.03 [28.38] | \$23.78 [40.52] |
| <i>Panel B: Fraction of sample by characteristics</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Male | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.46 |
| High School Dropouts (HSD) | 15.16 | 14.92 | 14.28 | 13.96 | 13.9 | 13.91 | 13.61 | 13.89 | 14.58 |
| High School Graduates (HS) | 55.76 | 55.19 | 55.04 | 54.89 | 54.43 | 54.09 | 54.32 | 53.7 | 54.88 |
| College Graduates (CL) | 29.08 | 29.89 | 30.68 | 31.15 | 31.67 | 32 | 32.07 | 32.41 | 30.55 |
| +Δ Frailty | - | 0.3 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.3 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.29 | 0.3 |
| -Δ Frailty | - | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.14 |
| Observations (N) | 11,777 | 12,210 | 12,727 | 13,177 | 13,473 | 13,524 | 13,294 | 14,092 | 104,274 |
| # of Individuals (n) | | | | | | | | | 21,024 |
| Average # of Years Observed (T) | | | | | | | | | 4.86 |

Note: The summary statistics are for ages 25 to 94 of household heads and spouses. Individuals included in the sample are in at least 2 consecutive waves in PSID. Annual earnings is an individual's labor earnings for the year (in 2012\$). Annual hours is the sum of reported working hours for the year. Hourly wage is annual earnings divided by annual hours for labor force participants. Means are reported; median values are reported in parentheses; standard deviations are reported in brackets.

Summary Statistics for Dynamic Panel Sample

| | 2002 | 2004 | 2006 | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016 | Pooled 2002-2016 |
|--|--|---|---|---|---|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|
| <i>Panel A: Mean (median) [standard deviation] of sample characteristics</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Age | 40.75 (41) [11.11] | 41.2 (42) [11.77] | 41.73 (42) [12.33] | 42.36 (42) [12.85] | 42.97 (42) [13.34] | 43.77 (42) [13.7] | 45.64 (44) [13.7] | 47.53 (46) [13.69] | 42.65 (42) [12.72] |
| Frailty | 0.08 (0.07) [0.09] | 0.09 (0.07) [0.09] | 0.10 (0.07) [0.1] | 0.10 (0.07) [0.1] | 0.11 (0.07) [0.11] | 0.11 (0.07) [0.11] | 0.12 (0.10) [0.12] | 0.13 (0.10) [0.12] | 0.11 (0.07) [0.11] |
| Annual Earnings | \$39,913.5 (30,944.81) [73,161.16] | \$39,951.17 (30,446.27) [68,148.32] | \$39,779.58 (30,277.88) [65,088.35] | \$39,670.04 (29,730.3) [77,401.9] | \$36,294.58 (26,121.94) [58,809.46] | \$36,659.7 (25,100) [92,687.86] | \$36,554.79 (26,256.93) [70,310.25] | \$38,088.25 (27,860.24) [56,168.13] | \$38,526.71 (29,174.36) [68,482.15] |
| Annual Hours | 1,698.71 (1,960) [965.19] | 1,675.51 (1,960) [990.17] | 1,647.33 (1,944) [989.62] | 1,550.34 (1,880) [949.76] | 1,466.27 (1,820) [1,011.75] | 1,492.25 (1,856) [1,030.75] | 1,495.81 (1,872) [1,051.32] | 1,482.53 (1,888) [1,064.97] | 1,590.6 (1,920) [999.24] |
| Hourly Wage | \$22.84 (17.84) [25.85] | \$23.27 (17.94) [28.3] | \$23.03 (17.74) [23.46] | \$24.38 (18.96) [27.15] | \$24.01 (18.09) [26.59] | \$23.27 (17.56) [25.73] | \$23.67 (18.04) [23.07] | \$25.27 (18.89) [26.81] | \$23.50 (18.06) [25.37] |
| <i>Panel B: Fraction of sample by characteristics</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Male | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.45 |
| High School Dropouts (HSD) | 13.47 | 13.31 | 13.06 | 13.02 | 13.04 | 13.04 | 13.12 | 12.86 | 13.21 |
| High School Graduates (HS) | 55.62 | 55.06 | 54.56 | 54.33 | 53.97 | 53.47 | 53.49 | 53.42 | 54.51 |
| College Graduates (CL) | 30.91 | 31.63 | 32.39 | 32.66 | 32.99 | 33.48 | 33.39 | 33.72 | 32.28 |
| +Δ Frailty | - | 0.28 | 0.32 | 0.3 | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.27 | 0.27 | 0.29 |
| -Δ Frailty | - | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.13 |
| Observations (N) | 9,665 | 10,100 | 10,647 | 11,174 | 11,536 | 11,663 | 10,809 | 10,206 | 85,800 |
| # of Individuals (n) | | | | | | | | | 14,269 |
| Average # of Years Observed (T) | | | | | | | | | 6.01 |

Note: The summary statistics are for ages 25 to 64 of household heads and spouses. Individuals included in the sample are in at least 2 consecutive waves in PSID. Annual earnings is an individual's labor earnings for the year (in 2012\$). Annual hours is the sum of reported working hours for the year. Hourly wage is annual earnings divided by annual hours for labor force participants. Means are reported; median values are reported in parentheses; standard deviations are reported in brackets.

Summary Statistics for Dynamic Panel Sample, Workers

| | 2002 | 2004 | 2006 | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016 | Pooled 2002-2016 |
|--|---|--------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| <i>Panel A: Mean (median) [standard deviation] of sample characteristics</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Age | 38.69 (39) [9.61] | 38.95 (39) [10.26] | 39.39 (39) [10.79] | 39.77 (39) [11.33] | 40.14 (39) [11.83] | 40.66 (39) [12.13] | 42.42 (40) [12.1] | 44.34 (42) [12.14] | 40.10 (39) [11.19] |
| Frailty | 0.06 (0.04) [0.06] | 0.06 (0.07) [0.06] | 0.07 (0.07) [0.06] | 0.07 (0.07) [0.07] | 0.08 (0.07) [0.07] | 0.08 (0.07) [0.07] | 0.09 (0.07) [0.08] | 0.09 (0.07) [0.08] | 0.08 (0.07) [0.07] |
| Annual Earnings | 51,857.65 (39,609.35) [84,044.28] | 53,167 (41,463.79) [64,951.95] | 53,876.26 (41,491.91) [59,016.86] | 54,826.77 (42,471.86) [63,531.05] | 52,899.68 (41,585.08) [64,581.51] | 54,881.27 (40,000) [120,948.31] | 55,503.18 (42,789.07) [87,450.06] | 58,201.99 (45,152.8) [64,377.8] | 53,757.76 (41,463.79) [75,912] |
| Annual Hours | 2124.32 (2065.5) [654.65] | 2140.36 (2080) [671.24] | 2122.89 (2064) [649.82] | 2034.56 (2000) [593.82] | 2037.7 (2024) [637.21] | 2081.94 (2040) [642.07] | 2106.28 (2050) [634.54] | 2096.56 (2056) [645.84] | 2095.49 (2040) [639.66] |
| Hourly Wage | 23.9 (19.06) [22.37] | 24.72 (19.35) [27.64] | 24.72 (19.42) [22.21] | 26.35 (20.42) [27.6] | 25.57 (19.8) [25.85] | 25.31 (19.32) [27.99] | 26.02 (19.98) [24.33] | 27.78 (21.52) [26.21] | 25.29 (19.67) [25.09] |
| <i>Panel B: Fraction of sample by characteristics</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Male | 0.54 | 0.54 | 0.54 | 0.54 | 0.54 | 0.54 | 0.53 | 0.53 | 0.54 |
| High School Dropouts (HSD) | 8.82 | 8.02 | 7.28 | 6.84 | 6.68 | 6.59 | 6.64 | 6.5 | 7.4 |
| High School Graduates (HS) | 50.35 | 49.77 | 49.47 | 49.27 | 49.46 | 48.99 | 48.89 | 48.87 | 49.61 |
| College Graduates (CL) | 40.82 | 42.21 | 43.25 | 43.89 | 43.86 | 44.42 | 44.48 | 44.63 | 42.99 |
| +Δ Frailty | - | 0.24 | 0.28 | 0.26 | 0.23 | 0.24 | 0.23 | 0.23 | 0.24 |
| -Δ Frailty | - | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.10 |
| Observations (N) | 4794 | 4937 | 5237 | 5557 | 5869 | 6119 | 5742 | 5355 | 43610 |
| # of Individuals (n) | | | | | | | | | 7,539 |
| Average # of Years Observed (T) | | | | | | | | | 5.78 |

Note: The summary statistics are for ages 25 to 64 of household heads and spouses. Individuals included in the sample are in at least 2 consecutive waves in PSID. Annual earnings is an individual's labor earnings for the year (in 2012\$). Annual hours is the sum of reported working hours for the year. Hourly wage is annual earnings divided by annual hours for labor force participants. Means are reported; median values are reported in parentheses; standard deviations are reported in brackets.

Blundell-Bond System GMM Estimation

- In short panels, fixed effect estimator biases can be severe (Nickell (1981 ECTA)).
- Following Blundell-Bond (1998, JoEtrics), we estimate the following using GMM

$$\begin{bmatrix} y_{i,t} \\ \Delta y_{i,t} \end{bmatrix} = \gamma \begin{bmatrix} f_{i,t} \\ \Delta f_{i,t} \end{bmatrix} + \alpha_1 \begin{bmatrix} y_{i,t-1} \\ \Delta y_{i,t-1} \end{bmatrix} + \alpha_2 \begin{bmatrix} y_{i,t-2} \\ \Delta y_{i,t-2} \end{bmatrix} + \delta \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{Z}_{i,t} \\ \Delta \mathbf{Z}_{i,t} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{i,t} \\ \Delta \varepsilon_{i,t} \end{bmatrix}$$

- Full sample:
 - Use $f_{i,t-k}$, $y_{i,t-k}$, $k = 4, 5$ as instruments for differences
 - Use $\Delta f_{i,t-k}$, $\Delta y_{i,t-k}$, $k = 4, 5$ as instruments for levels
- Workers $k = 5, 6$ and frailty (reverse causality) $k = 6, 7, 8$.
- Use system estimator because earnings and frailty are close to random walk.

Blundell-Bond System GMM Estimation

- For our instruments to be valid it must be that:
 - lagged levels are uncorrelated with current error term.
 - correlation between endogenous variables and the unobserved (fixed) effect is constant over time.
- To check these assumptions we run the following tests:
 - AR(1) test for no ser corr in error terms (of diff eqn): this should be rejected (by construction)
 - AR(2) test for no second-order ser corr in error terms (of diff eqn): this should not be rejected
 - Hansen test for validity of level instruments: this should not be rejected
 - Diff-in-Hansen test for validity of diff instruments: this should not be rejected
- Also do additional robustness checks.

Dynamic Panel Additional Robustness Checks

- **Perform Diff-in-Hansen test on y-lag set only.**
- Check that estimates lie in expected range based on OLS and FE.
- Run F-tests of instrument power.
- Conduct robustness tests to instrument set.

► Go Back

Effect of Frailty on Earnings

Full Set of Diagnostic Tests

| | Everyone | | | | Workers | | | |
|--|----------|---------|-----------|--------|---------|---------|-----------|--------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| | | By Educ | By Health | By Age | | By Educ | By Health | By Age |
| AR(1) test (p -value) | 0.455 | 0.319 | 0.497 | 0.104 | 0.030 | 0.010 | 0.021 | 0.008 |
| AR(2) test (p -value) | 0.380 | 0.474 | 0.298 | 0.949 | 0.130 | 0.082 | 0.138 | 0.160 |
| Hansen test (p -value) | 0.796 | 0.132 | 0.826 | 0.752 | 0.434 | 0.826 | 0.543 | 0.465 |
| Diff-in-Hansen test (p -value) | 0.652 | 0.360 | 0.827 | 0.464 | 0.255 | 0.484 | 0.259 | 0.214 |
| Diff-in-Hansen test (p -value), Y-lag set | 0.796 | 0.516 | 0.960 | 0.479 | 0.434 | 0.388 | 0.283 | 0.249 |
| Starting IV Lag t-k ($k=$) | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Ending IV Lag t-k ($k=$) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |

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Dynamic Panel Additional Robustness Checks

- Perform Diff-in-Hansen test on y-lag set only.
- **Check that estimates lie in expected range based on OLS and FE.**
- Run F-tests of instrument power.
- Conduct robustness tests to instrument set.

► Go Back

Effect of Frailty on Earnings

Comparison of OLS, FE, and BB

| | OLS | Everyone FE | SYS-GMM | OLS | Workers FE | SYS-GMM |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| $\log(\text{earnings}_{t-1})$ | 0.564*** (0.006) | 0.206*** (0.004) | 0.283 (0.364) | 0.555*** (0.013) | 0.098*** (0.006) | 1.474*** (0.509) |
| $\log(\text{earnings}_{t-2})$ | 0.188*** (0.006) | -0.021*** (0.005) | 0.396 (0.298) | 0.240*** (0.012) | -0.031*** (0.006) | -0.640 (0.454) |
| frailty_t | -4.973*** (0.138) | -8.818*** (0.235) | -5.374*** (1.653) | -0.519*** (0.044) | -0.471*** (0.084) | -0.978** (0.447) |
| Observations | 64,965 | 64,965 | 64,965 | 34,274 | 34,274 | 34,274 |
| R^2 | 0.580 | 0.432 | | 0.601 | 0.080 | |

► Go Back

Effect of Frailty on Earnings – Young vs Old

Comparison of OLS, FE, and BB

| | OLS | Everyone FE | SYS-GMM | OLS | Workers FE | SYS-GMM |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| $\log(\text{earnings}_{t-1})$ | 0.564*** (0.006) | 0.206*** (0.004) | 0.628** (0.291) | 0.555*** (0.013) | 0.098*** (0.006) | 1.127*** (0.302) |
| $\log(\text{earnings}_{t-2})$ | 0.188*** (0.006) | -0.021*** (0.005) | 0.115 (0.239) | 0.241*** (0.012) | -0.031*** (0.006) | -0.308 (0.273) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Young}$ | -4.870*** (0.202) | -8.547*** (0.297) | -4.992*** (1.784) | -0.660*** (0.061) | -0.483*** (0.099) | -1.650** (0.673) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Old}$ | -5.034*** (0.161) | -8.943*** (0.249) | -4.030*** (1.317) | -0.376*** (0.054) | -0.463*** (0.091) | -0.293 (0.365) |
| Observations | 64,965 | 64,965 | 64,965 | 34,274 | 34,274 | 34,274 |
| R^2 | 0.580 | 0.433 | | 0.601 | 0.080 | |

► Go Back

Effect of Frailty on Earnings – Education

Comparison of OLS, FE, and BB

| | OLS | Everyone FE | SYS-GMM | OLS | Workers FE | SYS-GMM |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| $\log(\text{earnings}_{t-1})$ | 0.560*** (0.006) | 0.206*** (0.004) | 0.370 (0.319) | 0.544*** (0.013) | 0.097*** (0.006) | 1.371*** (0.400) |
| $\log(\text{earnings}_{t-2})$ | 0.183*** (0.006) | -0.022*** (0.005) | 0.318 (0.259) | 0.233*** (0.011) | -0.031*** (0.006) | -0.569 (0.356) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{HSD}$ | -6.143*** (0.213) | -8.533*** (0.526) | -6.269*** (1.777) | -1.340*** (0.111) | -0.742*** (0.254) | -1.846** (0.807) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{HS}$ | -5.215*** (0.155) | -9.586*** (0.289) | -5.591*** (1.574) | -0.762*** (0.052) | -0.712*** (0.107) | -1.239*** (0.460) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{CL}$ | -3.003*** (0.209) | -6.900*** (0.457) | -2.519* (1.402) | 0.053 (0.053) | -0.014 (0.132) | -0.558 (0.484) |
| Observations | 64,965 | 64,965 | 64,965 | 34,274 | 34,274 | 34,274 |
| R^2 | 0.581 | 0.435 | | 0.605 | 0.089 | |

Effect of Frailty on Earnings – Good Health vs Bad Health

Comparison of OLS, FE, and BB

| | OLS | Everyone FE | SYS-GMM | OLS | Workers FE | SYS-GMM |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| $\log(\text{earnings}_{t-1})$ | 0.564*** (0.006) | 0.206*** (0.004) | 0.220 (0.362) | 0.555*** (0.013) | 0.097*** (0.006) | 1.293*** (0.410) |
| $\log(\text{earnings}_{t-2})$ | 0.188*** (0.006) | -0.021*** (0.005) | 0.444 (0.297) | 0.240*** (0.012) | -0.031*** (0.006) | -0.498 (0.377) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Good Health}$ | -3.076*** (0.305) | -6.816*** (0.499) | -1.930 (4.816) | -0.610*** (0.082) | -0.230* (0.135) | -1.765 (1.775) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Bad Health}$ | -4.818*** (0.137) | -8.607*** (0.239) | -5.207*** (1.745) | -0.522*** (0.044) | -0.446*** (0.085) | -0.963** (0.469) |
| Observations | 64,965 | 64,965 | 64,965 | 34,274 | 34,274 | 34,274 |
| R^2 | 0.580 | 0.433 | | 0.601 | 0.079 | |

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Effect of Frailty on Hours

Comparison of OLS, FE, and BB

| | OLS | Everyone FE | SYS-GMM | OLS | Workers FE | SYS-GMM |
|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| $\log(\text{hours}_{t-1})$ | 0.554*** (0.006) | 0.200*** (0.004) | 0.399 (0.322) | 0.332*** (0.008) | -0.027*** (0.006) | 0.003 (0.345) |
| $\log(\text{hours}_{t-2})$ | 0.180*** (0.006) | -0.028*** (0.004) | 0.263 (0.257) | 0.157*** (0.007) | -0.090*** (0.006) | 0.304 (0.218) |
| frailty_t | -3.626*** (0.100) | -6.655*** (0.172) | -3.887*** (1.188) | -0.175*** (0.028) | -0.442*** (0.056) | 0.070 (0.246) |
| Observations | 64,965 | 64,965 | 64,965 | 34,274 | 34,274 | 34,274 |
| R^2 | 0.556 | 0.400 | | 0.234 | 0.001 | |

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Effect of Frailty on Hours – Young vs Old

Comparison of OLS, FE, and BB

| | Everyone | | | Workers | | |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| | OLS | FE | SYS-GMM | OLS | FE | SYS-GMM |
| $\log(\text{hours}_{t-1})$ | 0.554*** (0.006) | 0.200*** (0.004) | 0.669*** (0.257) | 0.332*** (0.008) | -0.027*** (0.006) | 0.382 (0.318) |
| $\log(\text{hours}_{t-2})$ | 0.180*** (0.006) | -0.028*** (0.004) | 0.048 (0.206) | 0.157*** (0.007) | -0.090*** (0.006) | 0.254 (0.246) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Young}$ | -3.457*** (0.149) | -6.411*** (0.217) | -3.564*** (1.325) | -0.200*** (0.039) | -0.484*** (0.066) | -0.286 (0.387) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Old}$ | -3.726*** (0.116) | -6.767*** (0.182) | -3.131*** (0.936) | -0.151*** (0.036) | -0.414*** (0.060) | 0.144 (0.259) |
| Observations | 64,965 | 64,965 | 64,965 | 34,274 | 34,274 | 34,274 |
| R^2 | 0.556 | 0.401 | | 0.234 | 0.001 | |

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Effect of Frailty on Hours – Education

Comparison of OLS, FE, and BB

| | Everyone | | | Workers | | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| | OLS | FE | SYS-GMM | OLS | FE | SYS-GMM |
| $\log(\text{hours}_{t-1})$ | 0.550*** (0.006) | 0.200*** (0.004) | 0.383 (0.319) | 0.331*** (0.008) | -0.027*** (0.006) | 0.074 (0.313) |
| $\log(\text{hours}_{t-2})$ | 0.176*** (0.006) | -0.028*** (0.004) | 0.269 (0.253) | 0.156*** (0.007) | -0.091*** (0.006) | 0.168 (0.221) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{HSD}$ | -4.433*** (0.157) | -6.526*** (0.385) | -4.770*** (1.320) | -0.403*** (0.078) | -0.942*** (0.169) | -0.533 (0.356) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{HS}$ | -3.732*** (0.112) | -7.241*** (0.211) | -4.303*** (1.224) | -0.189*** (0.032) | -0.440*** (0.071) | -0.033 (0.281) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{CL}$ | -2.380*** (0.150) | -5.119*** (0.334) | -2.219** (1.118) | -0.092*** (0.035) | -0.311*** (0.088) | 0.248 (0.254) |
| Observations | 64,965 | 64,965 | 64,965 | 34,274 | 34,274 | 34,274 |
| R^2 | 0.557 | 0.402 | | 0.234 | 0.001 | |

Effect of Frailty on Hours – Good Health vs Bad Health

Comparison of OLS, FE, and BB

| | OLS | Everyone FE | SYS-GMM | OLS | Workers FE | SYS-GMM |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| $\log(\text{hours}_{t-1})$ | 0.553*** (0.006) | 0.200*** (0.004) | 0.386 (0.317) | 0.332*** (0.008) | -0.027*** (0.006) | 0.040 (0.311) |
| $\log(\text{hours}_{t-2})$ | 0.180*** (0.006) | -0.028*** (0.004) | 0.272 (0.253) | 0.157*** (0.007) | -0.091*** (0.006) | 0.282 (0.219) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Good Health}$ | -1.957*** (0.222) | -5.137*** (0.365) | -2.216 (3.455) | -0.046 (0.049) | -0.292*** (0.090) | -0.060 (0.910) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Bad Health}$ | -3.491*** (0.099) | -6.494*** (0.175) | -3.707*** (1.242) | -0.171*** (0.028) | -0.426*** (0.056) | 0.026 (0.258) |
| Observations | 64,965 | 64,965 | 64,965 | 34,274 | 34,274 | 34,274 |
| R^2 | 0.556 | 0.402 | | 0.234 | 0.001 | |

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Wage regression

Comparison of OLS, FE, and BB

| | Everyone | | | Workers | | |
|---------------------------|----------|----|---------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | OLS | FE | SYS-GMM | OLS | FE | SYS-GMM |
| $\log(\text{wage}_{t-1})$ | | | | 0.525*** (0.010) | 0.067*** (0.006) | 0.212 (0.541) |
| $\log(\text{wage}_{t-2})$ | | | | 0.288*** (0.009) | -0.028*** (0.006) | 0.532 (0.489) |
| frailty_t | | | | -0.378*** (0.037) | -0.028 (0.073) | -0.623** (0.263) |
| Observations | | | | 34,170 | 34,170 | 34,170 |
| R^2_* | | | | 0.592 | 0.056 | |

Wage regression – Young vs Old

Comparison of OLS, FE, and BB

| | Everyone | | | Workers | | |
|--|----------|----|---------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | OLS | FE | SYS-GMM | OLS | FE | SYS-GMM |
| $\log(\text{wage}_{t-1})$ | | | | 0.525*** (0.010) | 0.067*** (0.006) | 0.511 (0.399) |
| $\log(\text{wage}_{t-2})$ | | | | 0.289*** (0.009) | -0.029*** (0.006) | 0.272 (0.359) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Young}$ | | | | -0.481*** (0.050) | 0.028 (0.086) | -1.106** (0.463) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Old}$ | | | | -0.274*** (0.045) | -0.064 (0.079) | -0.414 (0.295) |
| Observations | | | | 34,170 | 34,170 | 34,170 |
| R^2_* | | | | 0.592 | 0.055 | |

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Wage regression – Education

Comparison of OLS, FE, and BB

| | Everyone | | | Workers | | |
|--------------------------------------|----------|----|---------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | OLS | FE | SYS-GMM | OLS | FE | SYS-GMM |
| $\log(\text{wage}_{t-1})$ | | | | 0.514*** (0.010) | 0.067*** (0.006) | 0.122 (0.368) |
| $\log(\text{wage}_{t-2})$ | | | | 0.279*** (0.009) | -0.029*** (0.006) | 0.600* (0.328) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{HSD}$ | | | | -1.040*** (0.102) | 0.191 (0.222) | -1.854*** (0.616) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{HS}$ | | | | -0.602*** (0.043) | -0.268*** (0.094) | -0.889*** (0.307) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{CL}$ | | | | 0.123*** (0.046) | 0.298*** (0.116) | -0.216 (0.309) |
| Observations | | | | 34,170 | 34,170 | 34,170 |
| R^2_* | | | | 0.596 | 0.063 | |

Wage regression – Good Health vs Bad Health

Comparison of OLS, FE, and BB

| | Everyone | | | Workers | | |
|--|----------|----|---------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| | OLS | FE | SYS-GMM | OLS | FE | SYS-GMM |
| $\log(\text{wage}_{t-1})$ | | | | 0.525*** (0.010) | 0.067*** (0.006) | 0.303 (0.449) |
| $\log(\text{wage}_{t-2})$ | | | | 0.288*** (0.009) | -0.028*** (0.006) | 0.461 (0.419) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Good Health}$ | | | | -0.561*** (0.071) | 0.061 (0.118) | 0.348 (1.685) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Bad Health}$ | | | | -0.384*** (0.037) | -0.019 (0.074) | -0.581* (0.332) |
| Observations | | | | 34,170 | 34,170 | 34,170 |
| R^2_* | | | | 0.592 | 0.055 | |

Dynamic Panel Additional Robustness Checks

- Check that estimates lie in expected range based on OLS and FE.
- **Run F-tests of instrument power.**
- Conduct robustness tests to instrument set.

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Dynamic Panel Additional Robustness Checks

F-tests instrument power results

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Dynamic Panel Additional Robustness Checks

- Check that estimates lie in expected range based on OLS and FE.
- Run F-tests of instrument power.
- **Conduct robustness tests to instrument set.**

► Go Back

Effect of Frailty on Earnings – Education

Robustness to instrument set

| | Everyone | Everyone | Everyone |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| $\log(\text{earnings}_{t-1})$ | 0.676*** (0.110) | 0.370 (0.319) | 0.055 (0.264) |
| $\log(\text{earnings}_{t-2})$ | 0.050 (0.046) | 0.318 (0.259) | 0.632*** (0.210) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{HSD}$ | -5.133*** (1.809) | -6.269*** (1.777) | -5.772*** (2.050) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{HS}$ | -5.009*** (1.610) | -5.591*** (1.574) | -6.532*** (1.876) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{CL}$ | -3.237** (1.313) | -2.519* (1.402) | -3.125* (1.743) |
| AR(2) test (p -value) | 0.156 | 0.474 | 0.024 |
| Hansen test (p -value) | 0.022 | 0.132 | 0.116 |
| Diff-in-Hansen test (p -value) | 0.015 | 0.360 | 0.151 |
| Diff-in-Hansen test (p -value), Y-lag set | 0.053 | 0.516 | 0.516 |
| Starting IV Lag t-k (k=) | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Ending IV Lag t-k (k=) | 4 | 5 | 6 |

Effect of Frailty on Earnings

| | Everyone | | | Workers | | |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|-------|---------|-----|-----|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| $\log(\text{earnings}_{t-1})$ | 0.283 (0.364) | 0.628** (0.291) | | | | |
| $\log(\text{earnings}_{t-2})$ | 0.396 (0.298) | 0.115 (0.239) | | | | |
| frailty_t | -0.199*** (0.061) | | | | | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Young (age} \leq 45)$ | | -0.185*** (0.066) | | | | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Old (age} > 45)$ | | -0.149*** (0.049) | | | | |
| <hr/> | | | | | | |
| AR(1) test (p -value) | 0.455 | 0.104 | | | | |
| AR(2) test (p -value) | 0.380 | 0.949 | 0.057 | | | |
| Hansen test (p -value) | 0.796 | 0.752 | 0.352 | | | |
| Diff-in-Hansen test (p -value) | 0.652 | 0.464 | 0.192 | | | |

Note: $*p < 0.1$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$

Similar effect for young and old

► Go back

Effect of Frailty on Hours - Young v. Old

| | Everyone | | Workers | |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| $\log(\text{hours}_{t-1})$ | 0.399 (0.322) | 0.669*** (0.257) | 0.003 (0.345) | 0.382 (0.318) |
| $\log(\text{hours}_{t-2})$ | 0.263 (0.257) | 0.048 (0.206) | 0.304 (0.218) | 0.254 (0.246) |
| frailty_t | -0.144*** (0.044) | | 0.003 (0.009) | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Young (age} \leq 45)$ | | -0.132*** (0.049) | | -0.011 (0.014) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Old (age} > 45)$ | | -0.116*** (0.035) | | 0.005 (0.010) |
| AR(1) test (p -value) | 0.287 | 0.043 | 0.409 | 0.180 |
| AR(2) test (p -value) | 0.596 | 0.706 | 0.273 | 0.642 |
| Hansen test (p -value) | 0.971 | 0.811 | 0.060 | 0.051 |
| Diff-in-Hansen test (p -value) | 0.944 | 0.545 | 0.080 | 0.037 |

Note:

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Effect of Frailty on Wages of Workers - Young v. Old

| | Workers | |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) |
| $\log(\text{wages}_{t-1})$ | 0.212 (0.541) | 0.511 (0.399) |
| $\log(\text{wages}_{t-2})$ | 0.532 (0.489) | 0.272 (0.359) |
| frailty_t | -0.023** (0.010) | |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Young}$ | | -0.041** (0.017) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{Old}$ | | -0.015 (0.011) |
| AR(1) test (p -value) | 0.651 | 0.362 |
| AR(2) test (p -value) | 0.454 | 0.734 |
| Hansen test (p -value) | 0.085 | 0.170 |
| Diff-in-Hansen test (p -value) | 0.044 | 0.104 |

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Empirical literature on earnings/wealth/job loss impacts on health

- **Overview:** No evidence of changes in income/wealth/employment on objective measures of health. Mixed evidence of impacts on mortality/mental health/risky behavior.

“[A] preponderance of evidence suggests that in developed countries today, income does not have a large causal effect on adult health,...Once childhood health is set, the effect of economic resources on health diminishes. In most of adulthood, income and wealth no longer appear to have a large effect on health. Education continues to be a powerful determinant of health, but to a great extent because of its impact on behaviors rather than its association with resources. Exactly why education affects health behaviors remains unclear, but much of the story seems to hinge on the ability to process new information and to take advantage of new technologies.” (Cutler et al., 2011 survey paper)

- **Papers:** Adams et al. (2003), Adda et al. (2009), Apouey and Clack (2015), Black et al. (2015), Cesarini et al. (2016), Eliason and Storrie (2009), Evans and Moore (2011), Evans and Snyder (2006), Gathmann et al. (2021), Junna et al. (2020), Meer et al. (2003), Michaud and Soest (2008), Ostling et al. (2020), Raschke (2019), Schaller and Stevens (2015), Schwandt (2018), Smith (1999, 2004, 2007), Sullivan and Von Wachter (2009)

Problem of Young Nonemployed Individual at $R - 1$

- Nonemployed individual with $j = R - 1$ solves

$$V^N(x, n_a) = \max_{c, a' \geq 0} u(c) + \beta p(j, f) E \left[\max \left\{ V^E(x', 1), V^R(x') \right\} \right]$$

subject to

$$\frac{a'}{1+r} + c + m^N(j, f, s) = a + Tr(x, n_a)$$

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Problem of a DI Beneficiary at $R - 1$

- DI beneficiary with $j = R - 1$ solves

$$V^D(x, n_d) = \max_{c, a' \geq 0} u(c) + \beta p(j, f, s) E[V^R(x')]$$

subject to

$$\frac{a'}{1+r} + c + m^D(j, f, s, n_d) = a + SS(\bar{e}) + Tr(x, n_d).$$

- n_d : number of periods on DI.

► Go back

Problem of a Retiree

- Retiree solves

$$V^R(x) = \max_{c, a' \geq 0} u(c) + \beta p(j, f) E[V^R(x')]$$

subject to

$$\frac{a'}{1+r} + c + m^R(j, f, s) = a + SS(\bar{e}) + Tr(x)$$

► Go Back

Equilibrium

- Return on assets, r , is exogenously given (small open economy)
- There is an aggregate production function

$$Y = AK^{\alpha}L^{1-\alpha}$$

where L is aggregate labor input = sum of hours \times productivity

- Wage per efficient unit of labor = marginal product
- Consolidated government budget holds – with exog. purchases g
- All measures are stationary – usual definition

Parametrization: Tax and Transfers

- Taxes includes
 - Proportional capital tax τ_K paid by firm
 - Federal income tax – HSV tax function
 - SS retirement & disability payroll tax – statutory tax formula
 - Medicare payroll tax

$$T(e) = e - \lambda e^{1-\tau} + \tau_{ss} \min\{e, 2.47\bar{e}_a\} + \tau_{med}e$$

- Transfers include
 - SS retirement & disability benefit – statutory benefit formula
 - SSI benefits to guarantee minimum DI payment \underline{b}
 - Welfare programs to guarantee minimum consumption floor \underline{c}

Estimation of Frailty Process: Deterministic Component

$$Prob(f_{ij} = 0) = \Phi(quad(age) + \nu_{ij})$$

$$\ln f_{ij} = quartic(age) + R_{ij},$$

$$R_{ij} = \alpha_i + z_{ij} + u_{ij},$$

$$z_{ij} = \rho z_{ij-1} + \varepsilon_{ij},$$

- Run OLS to remove time/sample duration effects
- Estimate zero frailty probit
- Estimate deterministic component of log frailty via SMM
- Calculate cohort-adjusted vars/covars of $R_{i,j}$
- Estimate process for $R_{i,j}$ using SMM
- Separate estimation for each educ group

Estimation of Frailty Process: Deterministic Component

| | HS Dropout | HS Graduates | Col Graduates |
|------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| age | 1.26 (0.095) | 0.988 (0.030) | 0.999 (0.064) |
| age ² | 2.19 (0.492) | 1.40 (0.146) | 2.04 (0.305) |
| age ³ | -0.607 (0.951) | -1.39 (0.380) | -0.838 (0.585) |
| age ⁴ | 3.03 (0.636) | 8.77 (0.307) | 3.05 (0.403) |
| const. | -2.50 (0.006) | -2.57 (0.003) | -2.83 (0.004) |

Note: age is scaled so that $\text{age} = (\text{age}-25)/100$.


Estimation of Frailty Process: Stochastic Component

results of estimating the shock process

| | HS Dropout | HS Graduates | Col Graduates |
|--------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| ρ | 0.979 (0.002) | 1.001 (0.001) | 0.9690 (0.002) |
| σ_{α}^2 | 0.2232 (0.0107) | 0.1542 (0.005) | 0.1270 (0.0050) |
| σ_u^2 | 0.0368 (0.0039) | 0.0506 (0.002) | 0.0357 (0.0023) |
| σ_{ε}^2 | 0.0286 (0.0018) | 0.0162 (0.001) | 0.0250 (0.0012) |

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
Stochastic frailty process for high school dropouts



- Mortality has little impact on the fraction at zero by age.

Stochastic frailty process for high school dropouts

Targeted Moments: Model versus Data




- Deterministic age polynomial targets mean frailty by age in data.
- Stochastic component targets variance-covariance profile of frailty residuals.

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Stochastic frailty process for high school dropouts


Targeted Moments: Model versus Data



- Effects of mortality on mean and variance of frailty are large at older age.

► Go Back


Stochastic frailty process for college graduates



- Mortality has little impact on the fraction at zero by age.

Stochastic frailty process for college graduates

Targeted Moments: Model versus Data




- Deterministic age polynomial targets mean frailty by age in data.
- Stochastic component targets variance-covariance profile of frailty residuals.

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Stochastic frailty process for college graduates

Targeted Moments: Model versus Data



- Effects of mortality on mean and variance of frailty are large at older ages.

► Go Back

Calibration: What is done outside the model

- Utility parameters : γ and μ
- Technology parameters: capital share α , depreciation δ
- Job separation rate σ , return on asset r , pop. growth ν
- Tax progressivity τ , payroll tax rates (τ_{ss} , τ_{med}), capital tax τ_K
- SS, SSDI, and SSI benefits, and minimum consumption \underline{c}
- The following processes
 - Stochastic processes for frailty and labor productivity
 - Out of pocket medical expenditures
 - Survival rates

► Ex-ante parameters

► Med exps and survival

► Go Back

Calibration: Predetermined Parameters

| Parameter | Description | Values/source |
|-------------------------|--|------------------|
| Demographics | | |
| J | maximum age | 70 (94 y/o) |
| R | retirement age | 41 (66 y/o) |
| ν | population growth rate | 0.02 |
| Preferences | | |
| γ | curvature of utility function | 2 |
| μ | weight on consumption (implies CRRA of 1.5) | 0.5 |
| Job Separation | | |
| σ | annual layoffs/separations in JOLTS | 0.15 |
| Technology | | |
| α, δ, r | capital share, depreciation, return on assets | 0.33, 0.07, 0.04 |
| Government policies | | |
| τ | tax progressivity (Guner et al (2014)) | 0.036 |
| τ_K | capital tax (Gomme and Rupert (2007)) | 0.3 |
| τ_{ss}, τ_{med} | payroll tax rates | 0.124, 0.029 |
| \underline{b} | SSI payment (% of ave. earning) | 13 |
| \underline{c} | minimum consumption (% of ave. earning) | 11 |
| G | government purchases (% of GDP) | 17.5 |

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Parametrization: Survival and OOP Med. Expenditure

- For survival: estimate (probit)

$$s_{ij} = \text{quad. poly. on age} + \text{quad. poly. on frailty} + \text{edu} + \text{gender}$$

Dataset: HRS

- For out of pocket medical expenditures: estimate

$$\text{oop}_{ij} = \text{cubic poly. on age} + \text{cubic poly. on frailty}$$

separate for each edu. & labor market status.

Dataset: MEPS

- Education: HSD, HSG, CG
- Labor market status: employed, non-employed and on Medicare, non-employed and not on Medicare

Estimating Productivity Profiles

Step 1: exclusion restriction

- Following Low & Pistaferri (2014) assume “potential” government transfers have different work disincentives for people w/ different health levels.
 - These effects are captured by interactions
- We regress participation on
 - log wage (1 and 2 lags), lag of frailty interacted educ., poly. on age, year dummies
 - interaction term: $\text{state} \times \# \text{ of kids} \times \text{marital status} \times \text{frailty}$
 - fixed effect
- We use estimated fixed effects in step 2

Estimating Productivity Profiles

Step 2: bias correction

- Follow: Al-Saddoon, Jimenez-Martin, & Labeaga (2019)
- Run log wage on
 - 2 lags of log wage
 - edu. interacted w/quad. of lag of frailty (treated exogenous – given our earlier findings)
 - age poly. + year dummies
 - fixed effects estimated in step 1

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Estimating Productivity Profiles

Estimation of frailty effect

| | Linear | | Quadratic | |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | w/o correction | w/ correction | w/o correction | w/ correction |
| $\log(\text{wage}_t - 1)$ | 1.044*** (0.298) | 1.034*** (0.295) | 1.039*** (0.298) | 1.024*** (0.295) |
| $\log(\text{wage}_t - 2)$ | -0.263 (0.270) | -0.262 (0.262) | -0.265 (0.268) | -0.259 (0.260) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{HSD}$ | -1.128** (0.453) | -1.201** (0.469) | -1.952** (0.900) | -2.056** (0.923) |
| $\text{frailty}_t^2 \times \text{HSD}$ | | | 3.477* (1.999) | 3.555* (2.018) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{HSG}$ | -0.662*** (0.235) | -0.741*** (0.251) | -1.048** (0.441) | -1.173** (0.467) |
| $\text{frailty}_t^2 \times \text{HSG}$ | | | 1.658 (1.015) | 1.810* (1.037) |
| $\text{frailty}_t \times \text{COL}$ | 0.052 (0.119) | 0.025 (0.119) | 0.397* (0.223) | 0.358* (0.217) |
| $\text{frailty}_t^2 \times \text{COL}$ | | | -2.058** (0.843) | -2.071** (0.834) |
| selection term | | 0.076** (0.035) | | 0.090** (0.038) |
| Observations | 23,874 | 23,755 | 23,874 | 23,755 |
| AR(2) test (p -value) | 0.182 | 0.163 | 0.182 | 0.163 |
| Hansen test (p -value) | 0.107 | 0.096 | 0.107 | 0.096 |
| Diff-in-Hansen test (p -value) | 0.307 | 0.417 | 0.307 | 0.417 |

Estimating Productivity Profiles

Steps 3 and 4: estimating shock process

- Using results in step 2, remove effect of frailty
- Run the remainder (separate for college and non-college) on
 - quadratic in age
 - year dummies
- Estimate age profile for 25-49 using PSID and 50+ using HRS
- Back out residuals
- Estimate a RIP process for residuals using GMM and PSID

Estimating Productivity Profiles

Step 3: Deterministic component estimates

| | Ages 25-49 | | Ages 50+ | |
|------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | Non-college | Col Graduates | Non-college | Col Graduates |
| age | 0.050 (0.003) | 0.092 (0.005) | 0.080 (0.018) | 0.006 (0.029) |
| age ² | -0.0005 (0.0004) | -0.0009 (5.2e-6) | -0.0008 (0.0001) | -0.0002 (0.0002) |
| constant | 1.878 (0.075) | 1.196 (0.108) | 1.224 (0.574) | 3.932 (0.924) |

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Estimating Productivity Profiles

Step 4: Shock process estimates

| | Non-college | Col Graduates |
|--------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| var. of transitory shock | 0.0824 (0.0115) | 0.0985 (0.0122) |
| var. of permanent shock | 0.0165 (0.0049) | 0.0181 (0.0059) |
| var. of fixed effect | 0.0920 (0.0145) | 0.1254 (0.0234) |
| persistence | 0.9218 (0.0231) | 0.9730 (0.0114) |

Comparison with Low & Pistaferri (2014)

- Low & Pistaferri (2014) estimate the effect of disability on wages for non-college men.
- They have three disability groups $d = 0, 1, 2$
 - $d = 0$: those with no work limitation
 - $d = 2$: those with severe work limitation
 - $d = 1$: the rest
- We calculate mean frailty for each of these categories in our sample
 - $d = 0$ has mean frailty of 0.07
 - $d = 1$ has mean frailty of 0.18
 - $d = 2$ has mean frailty of 0.28
- Using these values and our estimated coefficients, we can compute effects that are comparable to Low & Pistaferri (2014)

Comparison with Low & Pistaferri (2014)

Table: Effect of work limitation on wages (% decline in wages relative to no limitation)

| | mean frailty | Low & Pistaferri (2014) non-college | Our estimation | | | |
|---------------------|-----------------|--|----------------|-------|-------|---------|
| | | | non-college | HSD | HSG | College |
| No limitation | 0.07 | | | | | |
| Moderate limitation | 0.18 | -5.7 | -9.0 | -13.1 | -8.1 | -5.7 |
| Severe limitation | 0.28 | -17.7 | -18.0 | -26.1 | -16.1 | -13.8 |

- Note Low and Pistaferri's estimates are based on non-college sample only.

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Robustness to Exogenous Frailty

Estimation of frailty effect (men only)

| | ENDOGENOUS No Correction | ENDOGENOUS stateXkidsXmar | ENDOGENOUS +Xfrail | EXOGENOUS No Correction | EXOGENOUS stateXkidsXmar | EXOGENOUS +Xfrail |
|---|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| log(wage _t - 1) | 0.863*** (0.172) | 0.859*** (0.170) | 0.853*** (0.170) | 1.044*** (0.298) | 1.043*** (0.296) | 1.034*** (0.295) |
| log(wage _t - 2) | -0.093 (0.158) | -0.091 (0.161) | -0.088 (0.159) | -0.263 (0.270) | -0.274 (0.264) | -0.262 (0.262) |
| frail_hsd (one add. deficit) | -0.037 (0.024) | -0.039 (0.024) | -0.039 (0.024) | -0.042** (0.017) | -0.044** (0.017) | -0.044** (0.017) |
| frail_hsgp (one add. deficit) | -0.019 (0.018) | -0.026 (0.020) | -0.026 (0.019) | -0.025*** (0.009) | -0.027*** (0.009) | -0.027*** (0.009) |
| frail_col (one add. deficit) | 0.000 (0.021) | -0.003 (0.022) | -0.002 (0.021) | 0.002 (0.004) | 0.001 (0.005) | 0.001 (0.004) |
| eta | | 0.038 (0.152) | 0.059 (0.141) | | 0.046 (0.032) | 0.076** (0.035) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 23,874 | 23,755 | 23,755 | 23,874 | 23,755 | 23,755 |
| AR(1) test (<i>p</i> -value) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.010 | 0.008 | 0.009 |
| AR(2) test (<i>p</i> -value) | 0.195 | 0.183 | 0.189 | 0.182 | 0.152 | 0.163 |
| Hansen test (<i>p</i> -value) | 0.228 | 0.169 | 0.172 | 0.107 | 0.096 | 0.096 |
| Diff-in-Hansen test (<i>p</i> -value) | 0.370 | 0.324 | 0.356 | 0.307 | 0.385 | 0.417 |
| Diff-in-Hansen test (<i>p</i> -value), Y-lag set | 0.122 | 0.070 | 0.079 | . | . | . |
| Starting IV Lag t-k (k=) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Ending IV Lag t-k (k=) | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |

* *p* < .1, ** *p* < .05, *** *p* < .01

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Robustness to Exogenous Frailty

Estimation of quadratic frailty effect (men only)

| | ENDOGENOUS No Correction | ENDOGENOUS stateXkidsXmar | ENDOGENOUS +Xfrail | EXOGENOUS No Correction | EXOGENOUS stateXkidsXmar | EXOGENOUS +Xfrail |
|---|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| log(wage_t - 1) | 0.749*** (0.157) | 0.738*** (0.156) | 0.734*** (0.155) | 1.039*** (0.298) | 1.032*** (0.295) | 1.024*** (0.295) |
| log(wage_t - 2) | 0.007 (0.141) | 0.018 (0.140) | 0.020 (0.139) | -0.265 (0.268) | -0.270 (0.261) | -0.259 (0.260) |
| frail_hsd | -1.923 (2.617) | -2.660 (2.387) | -2.584 (2.371) | -1.952** (0.900) | -2.051** (0.931) | -2.056** (0.923) |
| frail_hsd_sq | 3.631 (6.762) | 4.883 (6.075) | 4.682 (6.037) | 3.477* (1.999) | 3.576* (2.049) | 3.555* (2.018) |
| frail_hsgp | -1.101 (1.428) | -1.931 (1.346) | -1.880 (1.346) | -1.048** (0.441) | -1.153** (0.463) | -1.173** (0.467) |
| frail_hsgp_sq | 2.891 (4.364) | 4.634 (4.039) | 4.515 (4.066) | 1.658 (1.015) | 1.785* (1.038) | 1.810* (1.037) |
| frail_col | 0.902 (1.198) | 0.434 (1.148) | 0.490 (1.150) | 0.397* (0.223) | 0.377* (0.228) | 0.358* (0.217) |
| frail_col_sq | -4.486 (3.189) | -3.831 (2.966) | -3.912 (3.032) | -2.058** (0.843) | -2.095** (0.855) | -2.071** (0.834) |
| eta | | 0.114 (0.155) | 0.132 (0.147) | | 0.061* (0.033) | 0.090** (0.038) |
| Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 23,874 | 23,755 | 23,755 | 23,874 | 23,755 | 23,755 |
| AR(1) test (<i>p</i> -value) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.010 | 0.009 | 0.009 |
| AR(2) test (<i>p</i> -value) | 0.452 | 0.463 | 0.471 | 0.178 | 0.155 | 0.166 |
| Hansen test (<i>p</i> -value) | 0.347 | 0.339 | 0.347 | 0.107 | 0.096 | 0.096 |
| Diff-in-Hansen test (<i>p</i> -value) | 0.200 | 0.233 | 0.251 | 0.309 | 0.403 | 0.435 |
| Diff-in-Hansen test (<i>p</i> -value), Y-lag set | 0.051 | 0.039 | 0.042 | . | . | . |
| Starting IV Lag t-k (k=) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Ending IV Lag t-k (k=) | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$


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Capturing severe disability

- Productivity process doesn't capture the effects of severe lifelong disability.
- To capture these effects we assume:
 - individuals face small probability of being born severely disabled (having zero productivity)
 - probability depends on frailty and education
 - pinned down by the fractions of 25 year-olds on SSI/SSDI in the data (2.3% overall)

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Frailty: Model vs Data



- Frailty process in model generates mean frailty levels by age and percentile groups that align closely with those in the data.

Assessment: DI and LFP by Education Groups

| DI reciprocity rate (%), ages 25–64 | | | |
|-------------------------------------|------------|--------------|---------------|
| | HS Dropout | HS Graduates | Col Graduates |
| Data | 11.8 | 6.6 | 2.7 |
| Model | 12.3 | 7.4 | 2.6 |

| LFPR (%), ages 25–64 | | | |
|----------------------|------------|--------------|---------------|
| | HS Dropout | HS Graduates | Col Graduates |
| Data | 78 | 87 | 94 |
| Model | 76 | 86 | 94 |

- The model matches levels and patterns of DI reciprocity and LFP by education.

Calibration: What is Chosen to Match Targets

- Prob. of DI acceptance parameters: $\theta(f, n_a) = \min \{1, \kappa_0 f^{\kappa_1} n_a^{\kappa_2}\}$
 - Targets:
 - SSDI enrollment by frailty percentiles and 5-year age group (ages 25–64)
 - Rate of decline in DI acceptance by year since initial application (French and Song, 2014)
- Disutility of work parameters: $v(f) = \phi_0 + \phi_1 f^{\phi_2}$
 - Targets: LFP by frailty percentiles for age group 25 to 74.
- Discount factor β
 - Target: wealth to output ratio of 3.2.
- Average tax parameter λ
 - Target: federal income tax as % of GDP = 8%.

Calibration: Parameters Chosen using the Model


Table: Additional Parameters and Targets: Values

| Parameter | Description | Value |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|--------|
| β | discount factor | 0.982 |
| λ | HSV tax parameter | 0.908 |
| Moment | | Target |
| | | Model |
| Wealth-output ratio | | 3.2 |
| Federal Inc. Tax (% of GDP) | | 8.0 |

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
Assessment: LFP by Frailty and Age

High School Dropouts: Model vs Data




Assessment: LFP by Frailty and Age

High School Dropouts: Model vs Data




Assessment: LFP by Frailty and Age

High School Graduates: Model vs Data




Assessment: LFP by Frailty and Age

High School Graduates: Model vs Data



Assessment: LFP by Frailty and Age


College Graduates: Model vs Data



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Assessment: LFP by Frailty and Age


College Graduates: Model vs Data



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
Assessment: % on DI by Frailty and Age

High School Dropouts: Model vs Data




Assessment: % on DI by Frailty and Age

High School Dropouts: Model vs Data




Assessment: % on DI by Frailty and Age

High School Graduates: Model vs Data




Assessment: % on DI by Frailty and Age

High School Graduates: Model vs Data




Assessment: % on DI by Frailty and Age

College Graduates: Model vs Data



Assessment: % on DI by Frailty and Age

College Graduates: Model vs Data



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
Sample Details

- Use PSID 2003–2017 (years 2002–2016)
 - Cannot construct frailty index in earlier waves.
- Sample consists of household heads and spouses aged 25–64 with non-missing labor earnings.
- Workers are defined as follows:
 - $LF_t = 1$ if hours ≥ 260 AND wages $> \$3/\text{hour}$
 - Worker = 1 if $LF_t = 1$ for all time periods observed
 - Wages = Annual labor earnings/Annual hours worked
 - Annual hours worked = $(52 - \text{weeks unemployed}) \times \text{average weekly hours}$
- Good/Bad health: frailty below/above 75th percentile


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Stochastic frailty process for high school dropouts


Fraction w/zero frailty



Mean log frailty age-profile



Variance-covariance moments




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
► COL

Stochastic frailty process for high school dropouts


Fraction w/zero frailty



Mean log frailty age-profile



Variance-covariance moments




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
► COL

Stochastic frailty process for college graduates


Fraction w/zero frailty



Mean log frailty age-profile



Variance-covariance moments




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
► HSD

Stochastic frailty process for college graduates


Fraction w/zero frailty



Mean log frailty age-profile



Variance-covariance moments



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► HSD

Why use frailty index?

1. Need objective measure of health to study health-contingent policies.
2. Easy to construct, univariate, and highly predictive of health-related outcomes: mortality, nursing home stay, DI reciprocity, medical expenditures. [▶ tables](#)
3. Better than self-reported health at predicting decline in health with age. [▶ illustration](#)
4. Cardinal and measures health on a fine scale → we can observe variation in the unhealthy tail and its effects. [▶ graph](#)
5. Can be treated as continuous variable → useful for estimating marginal effects.
6. Consistent measure of health across multiple datasets: PSID, MEPS, HRS.

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Related Literature

- **Impact of health on labor supply/earnings:** Bound et al. (1999), Blundell et al. (2017), French (2005), Garcia-Gomez et al. (2013), Lenhart (2019).
- **SSDI and disability:** Aizawa et al. (2020), French and Song (2014), Kitao (2014), Low and Pistaferri (2015), Meyer and Mok (2019), Michaud and Wiczer (2017).
- **Health and inequality and income distribution:** Capatina (2015), Capatina et al. (2020), Kim and Rhee (2020), O'Donnell et al. (2015), Prados (2017).
- **Frailty index:** Dalgaard and Strulik (2014), Hosseini et al. (2021), Schunemann et al. (2017a, 2017b), Searle et al. (2008).
- **Impact of income/employment/wealth on health:** Adda et al. (2009), Cutler et al. (2011), Junna et al. (2020), Smith (1999, 2004, 2007), Schaller and Stevens (2015).
- **Dynamic panel estimation:** Blundell and Bond (1998), Blundell and Bond (2000), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Al-Sadoon et al. (2019), Bond (2002), Roodman (2009).
- **Health and savings:** De Nardi et al. (2010), Kopecky and Koreskhova (2014), Porterba et al. (2017), Scholz and Seshadri (2013).
- **Welfare costs of bad health:** Cole et al. (2018), De Nardi et al. (2017), Rios-Rull and Pijoan-Mas (2019).

Calibrated Values

Table: DI Probability and Disutility Parameter Values

| Parameter | Description | Value |
|------------|--|-------|
| κ_0 | level | 179 |
| κ_1 | elasticity w.r.t. frailty | 5.9 |
| κ_2 | elasticity w.r.t. 'number of attempts' | 0.6 |
| ϕ_0 | level | 0.64 |
| ϕ_1 | frailty level effect | 2.8 |
| ϕ_2 | elasticity w.r.t frailty | 5.5 |

- DI probability $\theta(f, n_a) = \min \{1, \kappa_0 f^{\kappa_1} n_a^{\kappa_2}\}$ increases in frailty and number of years since initially applied.
- Disutility from working $v(f) = \phi_0 + \phi_1 f^{\phi_2}$ is increasing and convex in frailty.

DI Applicants in the Model

Table: Fraction of individuals non-employed for 1 year who are working 3 years later in the benchmark economy

| Age | All | By frailty level | | |
|-------|------|------------------|---------------|---------------|
| | | frailty > 0.1 | frailty > 0.2 | frailty > 0.3 |
| 25–65 | 31.9 | 30.8 | 27.7 | 24.6 |
| 35–64 | 28.5 | 27.8 | 26.3 | 23.2 |
| 45–64 | 26.2 | 25.9 | 24.7 | 21.2 |

- We assume those with frailty > 0.1 are DI applicants:
 - probability of getting DI is less than 0.1% if frailty below 0.1
 - under this assumption 50% of applicants successfully obtain DI one year after application consistent with estimated fraction in data (French & Song, 2014).
- Assumption doesn't have that big an impact on labor force participation rates.